Botha's reforms, Afrikaner resistance and the State of Emergency

What the specification asks for

“Reasons for the reforms of PW Botha and their consequences for the National Party and White, Black and Coloured South Africans. Afrikaaner resistance to reforms, especially the work of the AWB. Reasons for and consequences of the State of Emergency (1985–1990).” — examined through consequence. Incandio is aligned to specification 4HI1; it is not published by, endorsed by or affiliated with Pearson.

1 · Understand it

Why Botha reformed at all

Botha came to power in 1978 with a slogan often rendered as adapt or die, and the reasons for the adaptation were practical. The economy needed skilled labour that job reservation prevented it from having, and it needed capital that international opinion was making harder to obtain. The regional buffer had gone. And the regime's own security establishment had concluded that the threat was a total onslaught requiring a total strategy in which political reform was one component alongside military and police measures.

The reforms were real within their limits. Job reservation was largely abolished; African trade unions were legalised in 1979, which is the most consequential of the changes; the pass laws were repealed in 1986; the prohibitions on mixed marriage and inter-racial sex were repealed in 1985; and some petty apartheid signage disappeared.

What was not touched was the franchise, the Group Areas Act until 1991, or the classification system on which everything rested. Botha's position, stated repeatedly, was that political rights for Africans in a common parliament were not available at any price.

Rubicon and the financial collapse

In August 1985, with the townships in revolt, Botha was to address the National Party congress at Durban. The speech was briefed in advance by his foreign minister to foreign governments and journalists as a decisive announcement — the release of Mandela and a fundamental move away from apartheid were widely expected. What he delivered was a defiant refusal to be pushed, in which he said he was not prepared to lead white South Africans on a road to abdication and suicide.

The financial consequence was immediate and is the most important single fact in the key topic. The rand fell about thirty-five per cent in the following weeks. Chase Manhattan had already declined to roll over South African loans; other banks followed, and in September the government was forced to close the stock exchange and the foreign exchange market and to declare a standstill on repayment of short-term debt.

This was not a sanction imposed by any government. It was private banks deciding that a country in that condition was not creditworthy, and it did more damage in three months than two decades of United Nations resolutions.

Emergency, and resistance from the right

A partial state of emergency had been declared in July 1985 and was extended nationally in June 1986 and renewed annually until 1990. It permitted detention without trial, prohibited reporting on unrest, and gave the security forces wide indemnity. Tens of thousands were detained, including large numbers of children; the UDF was effectively restricted from 1988.

The emergency restored a degree of control in the townships and did not restore governability, and it did nothing about the economy. It also confirmed to foreign investors that the country was not stable, which is the sense in which repression and reform were now working against each other.

On the other side, the reforms produced a serious Afrikaner backlash. The Conservative Party broke away in 1982 over the tricameral proposals and became the official opposition in 1987. The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging under Eugène Terre'Blanche organised paramilitary displays and disrupted National Party meetings. Botha was therefore losing votes to his right for reforms that had satisfied nobody on his left, which is the position from which a South African government could no longer govern by adjustment.

2 · Learn it — the notes

The dates that earn marks

1979

African trade unions are legalised. Why this date: It is the most consequential of Botha's reforms, because it created the legal industrial power that COSATU exercised from 1985.

August 1985

The Rubicon speech: a reform briefed in advance is delivered as a refusal. Why this date: The rand fell about 35 per cent and the banks called in loans, which is the moment financial pressure became decisive.

July 1985 and June 1986

A partial and then a national State of Emergency, renewed until 1990. Why this date: It restored control without restoring governability, and confirmed to investors that the country was not stable.

1986

The pass laws are repealed. Why this date: The most hated instrument of daily control is abandoned while the franchise is untouched, which is Botha's reform strategy in a single measure.

The figures, and how far to trust them

• About 35 per cent — The fall in the rand in the weeks after the Rubicon speech. (The exact figure depends on the period measured; the scale and the timing are not disputed.)
• Tens of thousands — People detained under the states of emergency between 1985 and 1990. (No official cumulative total was published; estimates from monitoring organisations vary.)
• 1979 and 1986 — The legalisation of African trade unions and the repeal of the pass laws — the two reforms with real effects.

The people to place

• P. W. Botha — State President; combined limited reform with a national state of emergency, and refused any franchise concession.
• Eugène Terre'Blanche — Leader of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, which organised paramilitary opposition to reform.
• Pik Botha — Foreign Minister whose advance briefing of the Rubicon speech created the expectations it then disappointed.

How historians disagree

Attributed interpretations, never voiced — the AO4 seam.

• The 'too little too late' reading: Botha's reforms conceded the principle that apartheid could change while refusing the only change that mattered, which encouraged opposition without satisfying it and destroyed the regime's own coalition. Contested by The reading that the reforms of 1979–86 — legal trade unions, the end of job reservation, the repeal of the pass laws — were substantial and irreversible, and that they created the conditions in which a negotiated settlement became conceivable to both sides..

What students say — and what is actually the case

Not this: Botha's reforms gave black South Africans political rights.

This: The franchise was untouched throughout. What changed was job reservation, trade union law, pass control and some petty apartheid, and Botha stated repeatedly that a common parliament was not available.

Not this: Sanctions by foreign governments caused the financial crisis of 1985.

This: The decisive act was private banks refusing to roll over short-term debt, for commercial reasons, after the Rubicon speech. Government sanctions such as the American Act of 1986 followed the crisis rather than causing it.

Two things students merge

Blurred: Reform and concession of principle.

The distinction: Botha reformed a great deal and conceded nothing about the franchise. Distinguishing them explains why the reforms increased pressure instead of relieving it: they proved the system was changeable and refused the change being demanded.

Blurred: The state of emergency and the collapse of the townships.

The distinction: The emergency was the state's response to the revolt of 1984–86, not its cause, and it restored a degree of physical control without restoring administration. Reversing the causation is a common error.

What a Grade 9 answer holds here

A Grade 9 answer notices that Botha lost the argument in both directions at once. His reforms took the pass laws, job reservation and the marriage prohibitions away and left the vote untouched, which convinced his opponents that the system could be moved and convinced his own right that it was being surrendered — so by 1987 he was facing an ungovernable township revolt and an official opposition to his right, having satisfied nobody at all.

3 · How it is examined

This strand is genuinely set through: Paper 1 (a) (6 marks — “What impression does the author give about …? You must use Extract A to explain your answer.”); Paper 1 (b) (8 marks — “Explain two effects of … on ….”); Paper 1 (c)(i) or (c)(ii) (16 marks — “'[A statement about the period.]' You may use the following in your answer: • [prompt] • [prompt]. You must also use information of your own. How far do you agree? Explain your answer.”).

What earns marks: Rubicon with the currency figure attached. A speech and a thirty-five per cent fall in one sentence is the most economical way to show economic pressure becoming decisive.

The cap that bites here: The 16-mark question requires three aspects; reform, repression and economic pressure are the natural three here.

4 · Prove it — the questions

Answered inside Incandio, where a marker checks what a correct answer must contain and tells you which half was missing. The marking stays in the app; the questions are here.

1. What impression does the author give about P. W. Botha's reforms? [6 marks · Paper 1 (a)]
2. Explain two effects of the Rubicon speech of August 1985. [8 marks · Paper 1 (b)]
3. Explain two effects of the legalisation of African trade unions in 1979. [8 marks · Paper 1 (b)]
4. 'Economic pressure did more than internal resistance to end apartheid.' How far do you agree? [16 marks · Paper 1 (c)(i) or (c)(ii)]
5. 'Botha's reforms made the end of apartheid more likely.' How far do you agree? [16 marks · Paper 1 (c)(i) or (c)(ii)]

Carry on through the option

• Previous lesson: The United Democratic Front and township unrest
• Next lesson: International opposition, boycotts and sanctions
• Key topic 4 · PW Botha – response to resistance, 1978–90 · South Africa: from union to the end of apartheid, 1948–94 · the option's timeline · Incandio History
• The other key topics of South Africa: Setting up apartheid, 1948–54 · The growth of apartheid, 1955–59 · Resisting apartheid, 1955–78 · Dismantling Apartheid, 1990–94