Mozambique, Sudan, the Gulf Wars and the obstacles to success

What the specification asks for

“Mozambique (1990–94) and Sudan (2005–11). The UN role in the Gulf Wars. Obstacles to success. The continuing work of the specialised agencies.” — examined through difference and significance. Incandio is aligned to specification 4HI1; it is not published by, endorsed by or affiliated with Pearson.

1 · Understand it

Mozambique beside Bosnia

Mozambique's civil war had run since 1977 and ended with a peace agreement in Rome in 1992. The United Nations operation deployed to supervise it: monitoring the ceasefire, demobilising and reintegrating combatants, and organising elections held in 1994, after which the operation withdrew.

It worked. The war did not resume, the losing party accepted the result and became a parliamentary opposition, and the country has not returned to that war since. It is one of the clearest peacekeeping successes on the record and it is almost never mentioned.

The comparison with Bosnia is the strongest evidence in the whole option, because so much is held constant. The same organisation, the same years, comparable resources, and one operation succeeded while the other produced Srebrenica. The variable is consent: in Mozambique both parties had signed an agreement and wanted it implemented; in Bosnia one party intended to take territory and to remove its population.

The two Gulf wars

Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The Security Council condemned the invasion, imposed comprehensive sanctions and in November authorised member states to use all necessary means to restore Kuwait's sovereignty. A coalition acted under that authority in 1991. It is the clearest case of the Charter's collective security machinery operating as intended, and it happened because the Cold War had ended and the permanent members agreed.

In 2003 the position was reversed. The United States and Britain sought authorisation for military action against Iraq and did not obtain it, France and others being opposed; the war took place anyway. The organisation had been unable either to authorise the action or to prevent it.

The two cases together define the limits of the post-Cold War system. When the permanent members agree, the Council can confer authority on very large-scale enforcement. When they do not, and a permanent member is determined to act, the Council can neither permit nor stop it — which is a different kind of limitation from Cold War paralysis and is arguably more damaging to the organisation's standing.

Sudan, obstacles and the agencies

Sudan illustrates both halves of the record. The mission established in 2005 supported the agreement ending the long north-south civil war, monitored the ceasefire and supported the referendum that led to South Sudan's independence in 2011 — a substantial achievement conducted with the consent of both parties. In Darfur, at the same time, a separate operation faced a government that did not want it and a conflict it could not stop.

The obstacles to success can therefore be listed precisely rather than generally. They are: the requirement for great-power agreement; the requirement for consent from the parties on the ground; the dependence on member states to supply troops, equipment and money; mandates that do not match circumstances; and the difficulty of acting inside a sovereign state without a legal basis the Charter clearly provides.

Throughout all of this the agencies continued. The World Health Organisation's certification of smallpox eradication in 1980, the vaccination and nutrition work of UNICEF, the refugee protection of UNHCR and the food operations of the World Food Programme ran through every decade of political failure. The final judgement this option asks for has to hold both halves: an organisation that could not stop a genocide in Bosnia had eradicated a disease that had killed for three thousand years.

2 · Learn it — the notes

The dates that earn marks

1990–91

The Council authorises all necessary means to reverse the invasion of Kuwait, and a coalition acts. Why this date: It is collective security working as the Charter intended, and it required the permanent members to agree.

1992–94

The Mozambique operation supervises demobilisation and elections; the war does not resume. Why this date: It succeeded in the same years Bosnia failed, which isolates consent as the variable.

2003

The Council declines to authorise war against Iraq and the war takes place regardless. Why this date: The organisation could neither permit nor prevent action by a permanent member, which is a limitation distinct from Cold War paralysis.

2005–11

The Sudan mission supports the north-south agreement and the referendum leading to South Sudan's independence. Why this date: It shows the consent condition producing a substantial success while Darfur, without consent, did not.

The figures, and how far to trust them

• 1994 — The Mozambique elections, after which the losing party became a parliamentary opposition.
• All necessary means — The formula in the 1990 authorisation, now the standard wording for permitting force. (The phrase's scope has been disputed in later cases, notably Libya in 2011.)
• 2011 — South Sudan's independence following the referendum the UN mission supported.

The people to place

• Kofi Annan — Secretary-General 1997–2006; commissioned the Srebrenica report and pressed the case that led to the responsibility to protect.

How historians disagree

Attributed interpretations, never voiced — the AO4 seam.

• The 'consent is the variable' reading: Mozambique and Bosnia were handled by the same organisation in the same years with comparable resources, and the difference in outcome was that both Mozambican parties wanted the settlement implemented and one Bosnian party did not. Contested by The reading that this understates what mandates, resources and command arrangements contributed, since Bosnia was also given rules and troop numbers that guaranteed failure even where local consent existed..

What students say — and what is actually the case

Not this: United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s was a record of failure.

This: Mozambique succeeded completely in the same years Bosnia failed, and the Sudan mission supported a settlement leading to South Sudan's independence. The record is mixed and the pattern in it is what matters.

Not this: The Gulf War of 1991 and the Iraq war of 2003 had the same legal basis.

This: The 1991 action was authorised by the Security Council; the 2003 war was not, after authorisation was sought and not obtained.

Two things students merge

Blurred: Failure and impossibility.

The distinction: Where both parties want a settlement, peacekeeping works and Mozambique proves it. Where one does not, no mandate the Council was willing to write would have succeeded. Calling both failure hides the pattern.

Blurred: Authorising force and being obeyed.

The distinction: In 1990 the Council authorised action and it happened; in 2003 it declined and the war happened anyway. Its authority is real and it is not enforceable against a permanent member.

What a Grade 9 answer holds here

A Grade 9 answer runs the comparison the option has been building towards. Mozambique and Bosnia were handled by the same organisation in the same years, and one produced a durable settlement while the other produced Srebrenica — so the difference cannot be capability, and once consent is identified as the variable, Korea, the Congo, Namibia and both Gulf wars all fall into the same explanation.

3 · How it is examined

This strand is genuinely set through: Paper 2 Section B (a) (6 marks — “Explain TWO ways in which … was different from ….”); Paper 2 Section B (b) (8 marks — “Explain TWO causes of ….”); Paper 2 Section B (c)(i) or (c)(ii) (16 marks — “How significant was … in …, in the years …? / How far were … responsible for …, in the years …? You may use the following in your answer: • [prompt] • [prompt]. You must also use information of your own.”).

What earns marks: Mozambique set directly beside Bosnia. Same organisation, same decade, opposite outcomes — it is the closest thing to a controlled comparison the option contains.

4 · Prove it — the questions

Answered inside Incandio, where a marker checks what a correct answer must contain and tells you which half was missing. The marking stays in the app; the questions are here.

1. Explain TWO ways in which the UN operation in Mozambique was different from the UN operation in Bosnia. [6 marks · Paper 2 Section B (a)]
2. Explain TWO causes of the success of the UN operation in Mozambique. [8 marks · Paper 2 Section B (b)]
3. Explain TWO causes of the United Nations' inability to prevent the Iraq war of 2003. [8 marks · Paper 2 Section B (b)]
4. How significant was consent in determining the success of UN operations, in the years 1945–c2011? [16 marks · Paper 2 Section B (c)(i) or (c)(ii)]
5. How far had international organisations become more effective, in the years 1919–c2011? [16 marks · Paper 2 Section B (c)(i) or (c)(ii)]

Carry on through the option

• Previous lesson: Somalia, Bosnia and the Balkans
• Key topic 5 · The UN at bay, 1990–2011 · The changing role of international organisations: the league and the UN, 1919–c2011 · the option's timeline · Incandio History
• The other key topics of The changing role of international organisations: The creation and successes of the League, 1919–29 · The League challenged, 1930–39 · Setting up the United Nations Organisation and its work to 1964 · The UN challenged, 1967–89