Conventional and guerrilla war, 1945–75

What the specification asks for

“Continuing importance of conventional warfare, especially in Arab-Israeli conflicts. Superpowers and asymmetric guerrilla warfare, especially in Vietnam.” — examined through continuity and difference. Incandio is aligned to specification 4HI1; it is not published by, endorsed by or affiliated with Pearson.

1 · Understand it

The wars that looked like 1943

The Arab-Israeli wars are the standing evidence that conventional warfare did not end in 1945. In June 1967 Israel destroyed the Egyptian air force on the ground in the opening hours and then won an armoured campaign in Sinai in six days — a manoeuvre battle of concentrated armour and air superiority that would have been legible to a commander of 1940.

In October 1973 Egypt and Syria attacked with the same categories of weapon and a new emphasis: infantry anti-tank missiles and dense surface-to-air missile belts, which took a heavy toll of Israeli armour and aircraft in the opening days. The conclusion drawn everywhere was not that armour was obsolete but that it needed infantry and suppression of air defences to work — which is a refinement of combined arms, not a replacement of it.

So the nuclear age's conventional wars were fought with tanks, aircraft and artillery in the 1940s tradition, at very high intensity, and were decided in days rather than years. That is the continuity half of this strand and it is regularly forgotten by candidates who write the period as a story of guerrillas and warheads.

Vietnam: the asymmetry stated precisely

American forces in Vietnam had complete air superiority, overwhelming firepower, helicopter mobility and the ability to win almost any engagement they chose to fight. They dropped a tonnage of bombs on Indochina greater than that dropped by all sides in the Second World War, and they never lost a major set-piece battle.

The opposing forces — the National Liberation Front in the south and North Vietnamese regular units — declined to present a target. They dispersed, used tunnels and jungle, moved supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos and Cambodia, and kept a sanctuary in the north that American ground forces were not permitted to invade. Vo Nguyen Giap's method was to accept losses that would have been unbearable to a democracy and to convert time into political effect.

That is the asymmetry, and it is not about weapons at all. One side had to destroy an enemy; the other had only to avoid being destroyed until the first side's public withdrew its consent. The Tet Offensive of January 1968 is the clearest case: militarily a defeat for the attackers, who lost heavily and did not hold the cities, and politically a turning point in the United States because it contradicted the official account of progress.

What the period proves about the nuclear age

The defining fact of 1945–75 is negative. Nuclear weapons were not used in war after 1945, while conventional and guerrilla wars killed millions in Korea, Indochina, the Middle East and Africa. A change in warfare can consist of what stops happening, and an answer that can state that clearly has understood the period's shape.

The nuclear stalemate also explains the shape of the conventional wars. Neither superpower could afford a direct clash, so competition moved to places where it could be conducted through clients, and where a superpower's most powerful weapons were unusable. Firepower that cannot be used is not power.

2 · Learn it — the notes

The dates that earn marks

June 1967

The Six-Day War: Israeli air strikes destroy Arab air forces on the ground, followed by an armoured campaign. Why this date: It is the clearest demonstration that high-intensity conventional war persisted, and that air superiority obtained in hours could decide a land campaign.

January 1968

The Tet Offensive. Why this date: It separates military outcome from political effect more sharply than any other event on this option, which is the core of asymmetric warfare.

October 1973

The Yom Kippur War: anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles inflict heavy losses on armour and aircraft. Why this date: It forces the refinement of combined arms rather than the abandonment of armour, which is the more accurate lesson.

1973 and 1975

American forces withdraw; Saigon falls. Why this date: It dates the outcome and shows the two-year gap between withdrawal and collapse, which candidates often merge.

The figures, and how far to trust them

• Six days — The duration of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the shortest decisive conventional campaign of the period.
• Greater than the total dropped by all sides in the Second World War — The tonnage of bombs dropped by the United States on Indochina. (Compilations differ on what is counted and over which years; the comparison is robust, the exact tonnage is not.)
• 1965–73 — The span of major American ground involvement in Vietnam.

The people to place

• Vo Nguyen Giap — North Vietnamese commander; directed a strategy of protraction and political effect over battlefield victory.
• Moshe Dayan — Israeli Defence Minister in 1967 and 1973; associated with the doctrine of pre-emption and rapid manoeuvre.

How historians disagree

Attributed interpretations, never voiced — the AO4 seam.

• The 'political defeat' reading: The United States was not beaten militarily but lost the political contest at home, and the war shows that a democracy fighting a limited war against an opponent fighting a total one is structurally disadvantaged. Contested by The reading that the military approach itself was wrong — that firepower and body counts drove the population towards the insurgency, so the political failure was produced by the military method rather than separate from it..

What students say — and what is actually the case

Not this: The United States lost the major battles in Vietnam.

This: American forces won essentially every large engagement, including Tet. The outcome turned on whether victories converted into political control, and they did not.

Not this: Conventional warfare declined after 1945 because of nuclear weapons.

This: Korea in 1950–53 and the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 were fought at very high conventional intensity. What nuclear weapons prevented was direct war between the superpowers themselves.

Two things students merge

Blurred: A military victory and a strategic result.

The distinction: Tet was a military defeat for the attackers and a strategic success. Holding the two apart is the skill this strand teaches, and it is the reason the claim that American forces never lost a battle is not a defence.

Blurred: Guerrilla warfare and attacks aimed at civilians.

The distinction: Guerrilla forces fight armed opponents by dispersal and ambush; the Vietnamese also used regular divisions in 1972 and 1975. Attacks aimed principally at civilians to produce political fear are a different category, and merging them makes the analysis of Vietnam impossible.

What a Grade 9 answer holds here

A Grade 9 answer states the asymmetry as a difference in what counts as winning. The United States needed to destroy an enemy force and hold territory; the Vietnamese communists needed only to remain in existence until American politics changed. Two sides fighting to different definitions of victory is a more precise account than saying guerrilla tactics worked.

3 · How it is examined

This strand is genuinely set through: Paper 2 Section B (a) (6 marks — “Explain TWO ways in which … was different from ….”); Paper 2 Section B (b) (8 marks — “Explain TWO causes of ….”); Paper 2 Section B (c)(i) or (c)(ii) (16 marks — “How significant was … in …, in the years …? / How far were … responsible for …, in the years …? You may use the following in your answer: • [prompt] • [prompt]. You must also use information of your own.”).

What earns marks: The Tet contrast — heavy attacker losses and no cities held, but the American political turn — stated in one sentence with the date. It is the strongest single piece of evidence for asymmetry on the whole option.

The cap that bites here: The 6-mark difference question needs TWO differences; a single one, however developed, is held at 3 marks.

4 · Prove it — the questions

Answered inside Incandio, where a marker checks what a correct answer must contain and tells you which half was missing. The marking stays in the app; the questions are here.

1. Explain TWO ways in which the war in Vietnam was different from the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. [6 marks · Paper 2 Section B (a)]
2. Explain TWO causes of the American failure in Vietnam. [8 marks · Paper 2 Section B (b)]
3. Explain TWO causes of the continuing importance of conventional warfare after 1945. [8 marks · Paper 2 Section B (b)]
4. How significant was guerrilla warfare in changing the conduct of war, in the years 1945–75? [16 marks · Paper 2 Section B (c)(i) or (c)(ii)]
5. How far were nuclear weapons responsible for the character of warfare, in the years 1945–75? [16 marks · Paper 2 Section B (c)(i) or (c)(ii)]

Decide it

This lesson feeds a Decide History judgement — a position you commit to, an objection you answer, a criterion you name: What changed warfare most between 1919 and 2011: machines, manuals, or opponents?.

Carry on through the option

• Previous lesson: The arms race, MAD and proliferation
• Next lesson, in key topic 4: The first Gulf War, the Falklands and carrier warfare
• Also in this key topic: The decision to drop the atomic bombs
• Key topic 3 · New forms of conflict – nuclear and guerrilla war versus conventional war, 1945–75 · The changing nature of warfare and international conflict, 1919–2011 · the option's timeline · Incandio History
• The other key topics of The changing nature of warfare and international conflict: The changing nature of warfare, 1919–39 · Changing methods of warfare by land, air and sea, 1939–45 · Conventional war and the development of 'new' wars, 1976–2000 · Changing methods of warfare at the beginning of the 21st century, 2000–2011