The first Gulf War, the Falklands and carrier warfare

What the specification asks for

“Continuing importance of conventional warfare, especially in the first Gulf War. The Falklands War and developments in aircraft carrier warfare. Nuclear submarines and first Gulf War.” — examined through change and continuity. Incandio is aligned to specification 4HI1; it is not published by, endorsed by or affiliated with Pearson.

1 · Understand it

The Falklands, 1982: an old-fashioned war with new weapons

Argentina occupied the Falkland Islands in April 1982 and Britain assembled a task force to retake them 8,000 miles away, with no land air base within range. The campaign therefore depended entirely on two small carriers operating Sea Harriers, and on ships that had to remain within reach of the islands while under air attack.

The new element was the anti-ship missile. Exocet missiles launched from aircraft sank HMS Sheffield and the container ship Atlantic Conveyor, and other ships were lost to conventional bombs. The lesson taken by every navy was that surface ships without adequate air defence and early warning were extremely vulnerable, and that carrier air was not a luxury but the condition of operating at all.

The nuclear submarine also made its mark: HMS Conqueror sank the cruiser General Belgrano on 2 May 1982, after which the Argentine navy remained in port for the rest of the war. One submarine removed an entire fleet from the campaign without sinking it, which is deterrence operating inside a shooting war.

1991: five weeks of air attack and a hundred hours on the ground

The coalition campaign to expel Iraq from Kuwait began on 17 January 1991 with an air offensive against command centres, air defences, communications and then the Iraqi army in the field. It used stealth aircraft, cruise missiles launched from ships and submarines, and precision-guided munitions in numbers never previously available.

The ground offensive began on 24 February and Iraqi forces in Kuwait were defeated in about a hundred hours. The temptation is to say that air power won the war. The more precise claim, and the one that earns marks, is that air power made the ground war short: the ground offensive still had to happen, and it was the armoured advance that destroyed the Iraqi army in Kuwait and recovered the territory.

The other change is what a candidate can see rather than infer. The 1991 war was televised in near real time, with footage from the weapons themselves, and surgical became the word governments used about air attack. That framing shaped every conflict in the rest of this option, and it was always a partial description: most munitions dropped in 1991 were unguided.

What had not changed

Both wars were fought for territory, by states, with armies, navies and air forces, and both ended when one side's forces were beaten and withdrew. That is the continuity, and it is why the specification insists on the continuing importance of conventional warfare in a key topic about new wars.

The tools were also less new than the presentation suggested. Precision-guided bombs had been used in Vietnam from 1972; cruise missiles were a development of long-standing ideas; carriers had been the centre of fleets since 1942. What 1991 provided was the first demonstration of these things working together against a large conventional opponent, watched by the whole world.

The opponent is the variable an answer must handle honestly. Iraq in 1991 had a large army equipped on the Soviet model, dug into open desert, with no air force that could contest the sky, no sanctuary across a friendly border and no popular insurgency to fall back into. That is close to the ideal target for the coalition's method, and it is why the campaign has been read both as a demonstration of a new kind of warfare and as a demonstration of what happens when a conventional army chooses to fight the one battle its enemy is best at.

The Falklands makes the same point from the opposite direction. Britain won a campaign in which it was outnumbered in the air, operating at the end of an 8,000-mile supply line and losing ships throughout, because the Argentine forces did not use the advantages they had — a shore-based air force with limited range over the islands, a navy that stopped fighting after 2 May, and conscript defenders committed to fixed positions. Both wars reward a candidate who asks what the loser could have done differently, because that is the question that separates an account of weapons from an account of war.

2 · Learn it — the notes

The dates that earn marks

2 May 1982

HMS Conqueror sinks the General Belgrano; the Argentine surface fleet returns to port. Why this date: It shows a nuclear submarine removing a navy from a campaign by threat rather than by sustained attrition.

4 May 1982

HMS Sheffield is hit by an Exocet missile. Why this date: It is the moment the anti-ship missile's threat to surface fleets became undeniable, and it reshaped naval air-defence procurement.

17 January 1991

The coalition air campaign against Iraq begins. Why this date: Five weeks of air attack before any ground assault is the structural fact of the campaign.

24–28 February 1991

The ground offensive: about a hundred hours. Why this date: The contrast between five weeks and a hundred hours is the evidence for the claim that air power shortened rather than replaced the land battle.

The figures, and how far to trust them

• About 100 hours — The duration of the 1991 ground offensive.
• 8,000 miles — The approximate distance from Britain to the Falklands, which is why the campaign depended on carriers.
• A minority of munitions used in 1991 — The share that were precision-guided. (Published shares vary by campaign phase and by what is counted; the safe claim is that guided weapons were a minority of the total tonnage despite dominating the coverage.)

The people to place

• Norman Schwarzkopf — Commander of coalition forces in the 1991 Gulf War.
• Sandy Woodward — Commander of the British carrier battle group in the Falklands campaign.

How historians disagree

Attributed interpretations, never voiced — the AO4 seam.

• The 'break in military affairs' reading: Precision weapons, stealth and networked targeting produced a genuine break in 1991: a large conventional army was destroyed at very low cost to the attacker, and warfare had changed category. Contested by The reading that Iraq was an unusually favourable opponent — an army in open desert, with no air defence left, no sanctuary and no political depth — and that the same tools produced very different results against opponents who dispersed..

What students say — and what is actually the case

Not this: The 1991 Gulf War was won by air power alone.

This: A ground offensive was still required to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Air attack destroyed much of the Iraqi army's cohesion first, which is why the ground phase lasted about a hundred hours.

Not this: Most bombs used in 1991 were precision-guided.

This: Guided weapons were a minority of those used, though they dominated the television coverage and therefore the public memory of the campaign.

Two things students merge

Blurred: Air power deciding a war and air power shaping a war.

The distinction: In 1991 air attack made the ground campaign fast and cheap; it did not remove the requirement to advance and hold ground. The distinction is the difference between a Level 4 judgement and an assertion.

Blurred: The carrier's role in 1982 and in 1942.

The distinction: At Midway carriers fought each other for control of the sea. In the Falklands the carrier existed to provide air cover for an amphibious operation with no land base available. Same platform, different function.

What a Grade 9 answer holds here

A Grade 9 answer notices that both wars were won by seizing something the enemy could not replace: the Argentine navy's willingness to leave port, and the Iraqi army's command and air defence. The weapon systems differ enormously and the operational idea is the same, which is why 1982 and 1991 belong in one key topic.

3 · How it is examined

This strand is genuinely set through: Paper 2 Section B (a) (6 marks — “Explain TWO ways in which … was different from ….”); Paper 2 Section B (b) (8 marks — “Explain TWO causes of ….”); Paper 2 Section B (c)(i) or (c)(ii) (16 marks — “How significant was … in …, in the years …? / How far were … responsible for …, in the years …? You may use the following in your answer: • [prompt] • [prompt]. You must also use information of your own.”).

What earns marks: The five weeks against a hundred hours contrast, quoted as figures. It supports the precise claim about air power and defends against the imprecise one.

4 · Prove it — the questions

Answered inside Incandio, where a marker checks what a correct answer must contain and tells you which half was missing. The marking stays in the app; the questions are here.

1. Explain TWO ways in which the first Gulf War was different from the Falklands War. [6 marks · Paper 2 Section B (a)]
2. Explain TWO causes of the rapid coalition victory in the first Gulf War. [8 marks · Paper 2 Section B (b)]
3. Explain TWO causes of British success in the Falklands War. [8 marks · Paper 2 Section B (b)]
4. How significant was air power in changing warfare, in the years 1919–2011? [16 marks · Paper 2 Section B (c)(i) or (c)(ii)]
5. How far were developments in technology responsible for the outcome of the first Gulf War? [16 marks · Paper 2 Section B (c)(i) or (c)(ii)]

Decide it

This lesson feeds a Decide History judgement — a position you commit to, an objection you answer, a criterion you name: What changed warfare most between 1919 and 2011: machines, manuals, or opponents?.

Carry on through the option

• Previous lesson, in key topic 3: Conventional and guerrilla war, 1945–75
• Next lesson: Afghanistan, 'Star Wars' and the end of the arms race
• Key topic 4 · Conventional war and the development of 'new' wars, 1976–2000 · The changing nature of warfare and international conflict, 1919–2011 · the option's timeline · Incandio History
• The other key topics of The changing nature of warfare and international conflict: The changing nature of warfare, 1919–39 · Changing methods of warfare by land, air and sea, 1939–45 · New forms of conflict – nuclear and guerrilla war versus conventional war, 1945–75 · Changing methods of warfare at the beginning of the 21st century, 2000–2011